SPEECH BY MR ONG YE KUNG, MINISTER FOR HEALTH AND COORDINATING MINISTER FOR SOCIAL POLICIES, AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIDE EVENT ON OUTBREAK PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH SINGAPORE AND HILLEMAN LABORATORIES

Excellencies

Distinguished guests

Ladies and gentlemen

1.            Our hearts go out to all the victims of Ebola Bundibugyo in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and it requires the international community to take immediate actions. I am pleased to join you at this event today, co-hosted by Singapore, and also Hilleman Laboratories. It is a Singapore-based joint venture between MSD and Wellcome Trust. It was established to develop affordable vaccines and biologics against infectious diseases that disproportionately affect lower-income countries.

2.            Today, in the midst of this epidemic in DRC, we mark an important new effort. With support from the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, or CEPI, Hilleman will commence production of a vaccine candidate against Bundibugyo ebolavirus, for purposes of clinical trials. The candidate uses the recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus, or rVSV, platform – the same platform used for the existing licensed Zaire ebolavirus vaccine.

3.            This breakthrough effort offers a useful lens through which we can consider how the world should prepare for the next pandemic, which is an evolutionary certainty.

Three Complementary Plans

4.            It has been seven years since the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 exposed a painful reality, that while vaccines were developed at remarkable and record speed, access was profoundly uneven. Since then, there have been various efforts to address vaccine inequity, so that humankind will be better prepared for the next pandemic crisis.

5.            So there is, for a lack of a better term, Plan A, led by the World Health Organization (WHO), and this is the unifying global framework for preparedness and equitable access. One aspect is the Pandemic Fund which finances essential capacities – surveillance, laboratories and a trained health workforce – with a focus on low- and middle-income economies.

6.            Another key aspect is the WHO Pandemic Agreement, adopted in May 2025, which establishes a common framework for better sharing of genomic sequences of pathogens, in return for more equitable distribution of vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics. But much work remains on the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing annex, which is the core of the agreement.

7.         We should also recognise the important role of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. During COVID-19, Gavi worked with CEPI, WHO, UNICEF and other partners to bring governments and industry together, and make vaccines more accessible, especially to lower-income economies. This was difficult and painstaking work, which if I may add, sometimes is misunderstood and unappreciated. Equitable access is not achieved by an agreement alone. Vaccines have to be financed, procured and delivered to the people who need them, often across very different health systems.  

8. These are all vital achievements. But rules for distribution do not resolve the problem of demand exceeding supply during a pandemic crisis. When supply is scarce, inequity becomes much harder to prevent. Therefore, equity and supply must advance together.

9.         Hence, to support and complement Plan A, we do need a
Plan B: building sustainable regional manufacturing resilience. This requires each region to understand its needs, identify priority products and technology platforms, develop capability across drug substance, formulation and fill-and-finish, put in place the ability to scale production, and strengthen regulatory readiness.

10.       There are several ongoing efforts. The European Union has established HERA and the EU FAB network of “ever-warm” manufacturing capacity that can be activated during a crisis. Australia has a similar system.

11.       The African Union and Africa CDC have set an ambition for Africa to produce at least 60% of the vaccines it needs by 2040. In particular, South Africa has established the mRNA technology-transfer hub at Afrigen, while Biovac is developing a multi-vaccine production facility for cholera, polio, pneumonia and meningitis. In Latin America, Brazil has invested in various national mRNA platforms. The Fiocruz platform has been authorised to begin clinical trials.

12.       But building vaccine manufacturing capability is a highly complex task. It requires technical know-how, skilled people, quality systems, dependable supply chains, trusted regulation and the ability for rapid scale-up.

13.       Further, in a crisis, the best plans and investment efforts by a country may not yield the most effective vaccine. In fact I would say, most are not likely to. It may be discovered and developed by any of the many research teams around the world. Any vaccine production facility must therefore be able to secure a licence, receive technology transfer and adapt its production line quickly.

14.         Facilities must also stay “warm” in peacetime by producing vaccines or biologics that people need today, maintaining equipment, quality systems and workforce proficiency. You cannot simply turn on a dormant factory during an emergency and expect it to run smoothly. We need to keep the facility going during peacetime. So, preparedness is a living capability.

15.         Hence, I think we need a Plan C: a backstop that leverages global networks and co-operation, should regional efforts stall during an emergency. This is where Singapore, as a small and globally connected country, can make a focused contribution together with our partners. There are a few parts to this plan.

The Global Plan

16.         First, the world needs a vigilant surveillance system that detects dangerous pathogens early, which rests on platforms where scientists and governments are willing to share data willingly and quickly. Singapore works closely with GISAID, whose data-sharing framework requires users to acknowledge data contributors and preserves the rights of submitters. GISAID is the largest genomic data repository for influenza, SARS-CoV-2 and mpox viruses.          

17.         A recent case illustrates the value of this approach. In late July this year, Singapore’s National Public Health Laboratory detected a recombinant form of SARS-CoV-2, through routine genomic surveillance. Re-extraction and re-sequencing confirmed the genomic profile. At the time of assessment, it was the only such sequence detected in Singapore, with no closely matching sequence identified in GISAID’s database. The patient fortunately had mild illness, recovered, and no further local cases were detected. The sequence was submitted on the GISAID platform for global analysis.

18.         As Minister for Health, I was informed only after the scientific process was underway. This is as it should be. Public health surveillance must be professional, timely and transparent. Science needs to take precedence. A country that reports an unusual pathogen may worry, or the Minister may worry, about reputational or economic consequences. The answer is not to delay reporting, but to build international norms that recognise transparency as responsible conduct. Disease X will most likely be discovered in precisely this way: by an alert laboratory, connected to a trusted network, sharing an unusual finding before its significance is fully known.

19.         Second part of this plan is to support CEPI’s 100-day mission. CEPI has made significant progress in developing safe, effective and accessible vaccines for initial authorisation and manufacturing at scale within 100 days of identifying a pandemic threat. The strategy is to do as much work as possible before the crisis, by building prototype vaccine libraries for representative viruses, validating adaptable platforms, and preparing laboratories, clinical-trial networks, manufacturers and regulators to move in concert.

20.       Singapore is aligning our vaccine development effort under our Prepvax research initiative with CEPI’s mission. The work at Hilleman shows the value of this platform approach. Anchored in Singapore, Hilleman’s vaccine development and manufacturing capabilities serve the larger region and the world. Since the opening of the facility in November 2023, Hilleman has supported Singapore’s outbreak response capabilities through vaccine and biologics manufacturing platform as well as fill and finish.

21.         Hilleman’s Singapore facility is also adapting manufacturing know-how from MSD’s Zaire ebolavirus vaccine, ERVEBO, to accelerate the Bundibugyo vaccine candidate with CEPI’s support.

22.         It will produce material for early clinical trials, with the first batch available by the end of this year. Hilleman’s domestic production capacity could produce a drug substance equivalent to 50 to60 million doses, or 12 million doses of drug product annually for this vaccine. Depending on needs, Hilleman will make arrangements for technology transfer to a larger-scale manufacturer in the region.

23.         This is preparedness in action: existing science, an operating facility that is kept warm, and trusted partners to scale up – all of which shorten the path from threat to a full response. It offers us a possible approach in response to Disease X in future.

24.         Besides Hilleman, Singapore is also working with companies with capabilities across vaccine platforms and manufacturing, including Sanofi, GSK, Moderna and Thermo Fisher Scientific. We are part of Wellcome Leap’s RNA Readiness and Response Global, or R3G, network. Its model separates product development from production – an approach familiar in the semiconductor industry – and explores continuous-flow of RNA manufacturing to reduce bottlenecks.

25.         Because of the nature of Disease X – novel, deadly and fast spreading – perhaps mRNA offers the greatest flexibility in development and time to market. Singapore is therefore planning to support the mRNA influenza vaccine pilot initiative in Singapore. It serves a peacetime need, while building up our adaptable capability, and I hope Hilleman can support this.

26.         Third, vaccines must be evaluated, approved and deployed quickly without compromising safety and quality. During a crisis, we are in a fog of war, and regulators operate with urgency and incomplete information. Trust built in peacetime allows authorities to rely on one another’s assessments, share workloads and reduce duplication, while each jurisdiction retains responsibility for its own decisions.

27.         Singapore’s Health Sciences Authority participates actively in this international regulatory architecture. It is the first national authority assessed by WHO at Maturity Level 4 for medical device regulation, and it is a WHO-Listed Authority for medicines. As Singapore anchors vaccine manufacturing as a national capability, HSA will work towards the corresponding WHO benchmarking and listing for vaccines.

Pandemics Test Societies, Not Just Health Systems

28.         We should remember that while a virus is biological, a pandemic is never only a medical event. It is also political, economic and social.

29.         The 1918 influenza pandemic became known as the “Spanish flu” not because it began in Spain, but because wartime censorship constrained reporting in several belligerent countries, while Spain’s press reported openly. Information environments shape how societies understand diseases.

30.         The history of HIV and AIDS shows how stigma, fear and delayed political acknowledgement can obstruct a robust response. It also shows what sustained political commitment, scientific progress and international co-operation can achieve, such that HIV can now be managed as a chronic condition.

31.         Polio offers another lesson. Long-term public commitment to vaccination, supported across political divides and sustained through community delivery, brought the disease to the brink of global eradication.

32.         COVID-19 reinforced all these lessons. It disrupted livelihoods and trade; it led to prolonged school closures, the effects of which continue to reverberate amongst the affected students; it highlighted the disparity in healthcare systems and access to medical countermeasures amongst countries. It also accelerated diagnostics and mRNA vaccine technology and gave hope that we will be better prepared the next time.

33.         To prepare for Disease X, we must resist denial, stigma, unfairness and the temptation to retreat behind national borders when global co-operation is most needed. Instead, we must harness the constructive power of our unity of purpose. We need to co-operate with each other, place our confidence in science and put in place overlapping and complementary plans ahead of time.

34.         Plan A gives us stronger global rules and financing. Plan B builds sustainable regional capacity. Plan C connects the world and harnesses our collective strengths. None is sufficient alone. Together, they offer a credible path towards a safer and fairer world. In this architecture, Singapore will do what we can.

35.         The next outbreak will not wait for us to smoothen every kink and settle every disagreement. Preparedness must therefore be built now - patiently, practically and together. Thank you.